Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary Democracies.

Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign poli...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International Studies Quarterly Vol. 58; no. 4; pp. 729 - 741
Main Authors: Beasley, Ryan K., Kaarbo, Juliet
Format: Article
Published: Oxford University Press / USA Dec2014
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Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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Summary:Why do multiparty cabinets in parliamentary democracies produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party cabinets? Our paper argues that particular institutional and psychological dynamics explain this difference. We test this argument using a global events data set incorporating foreign policy behaviors of numerous multiparty and single-party governments. We find that more parties and weak parliaments promote extremity in coalitions, but parliamentary strength has the opposite effect for single-party governments. This study challenges existing expectations about the impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy.