Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.
Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic...
| Publicado en: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 98; pp. 109 - 128 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2017 Supplement S1
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes. |
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