Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.

Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic...

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Publicado en:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 98; pp. 109 - 128
Autor principal: James, Steven
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2017 Supplement S1
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.
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        au: James, Steven
        affil: Department of Philosophy, West Chester University of Pennsylvania
      su:
        Epistemics
        Memory
        Theory of knowledge
        Intellect
        Psychology
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        subj:
          Epistemics
          Memory
          Theory of knowledge
          Intellect
          Psychology
      ab: Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes.
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