Buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations.

We study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides, in case of a bilateral disagreement, flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment. A larger buyer pays a higher...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 29 - 57
Autores principales: Inderst, Roman, Montez, Joao
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Spring2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=134665221&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: ssf
    uiTerm: 134665221
    longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        07416261
        56RJ
      jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell)
      issn: 07416261
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Spring2019
      vid: 50
      iid: 1
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        134665221
        10.1111/1756-2171.12261
      ppf: 29
      ppct: 28
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 280KB
      tig:
        atl: Buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations.
      aug:
        au:
          Inderst, Roman
          Montez, Joao
        affil:
          University of Frankfurt
          University of Lausanne and CEPR
      su:
        Technology
        Purchasing agents
        Dealers (Retail trade)
        Structural frames
        Building trades
      sug:
        subj:
          Technology
          Offices of Real Estate Agents and Brokers
          All Other Personal Services
          Framing Contractors
          Finish Carpentry Contractors
          Purchasing agents
          Dealers (Retail trade)
          Structural frames
          Building trades
      ab: We study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides, in case of a bilateral disagreement, flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment. A larger buyer pays a higher per‐unit price when buyers' bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently low, and a lower price otherwise. An analogous result holds for sellers. These predictions, and the implications of different technologies, are explained by the fact that size is a source of mutual dependency and not an unequivocal source of power.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: N
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N