Advertising in an oligopoly with differentiated goods under general demand and cost functions: A differential game approach.
We present an analysis of advertising activities in a dynamic oligopoly with differentiated goods using a differential game approach under general demand and cost functions. The main conclusion is that the memoryless closed‐loop solution and the feedback solution are equivalent when there is no spil...
| Publicado en: | Manchester School (1463-6786) Vol. 89; no. 6; pp. 619 - 640 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=152950014&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 152950014 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 14636786 MSE jtl: Manchester School (1463-6786) issn: 14636786 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 89 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 152950014 10.1111/manc.12376 ppf: 619 ppct: 21 formats: tig: atl: Advertising in an oligopoly with differentiated goods under general demand and cost functions: A differential game approach. aug: au: Hattori, Masahiko Tanaka, Yasuhito affil: Faculty of Economics, Takasaki City University of Economics, Takasaki, Japan Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan su: Oligopolies Advertising Differential games Cost functions Open innovation sug: subj: Oligopolies Advertising Other Services Related to Advertising Outdoor Advertising Differential games Cost functions Open innovation keyword: advertising differential game general demand and cost functions oligopoly advertising differential game general demand and cost functions oligopoly ab: We present an analysis of advertising activities in a dynamic oligopoly with differentiated goods using a differential game approach under general demand and cost functions. The main conclusion is that the memoryless closed‐loop solution and the feedback solution are equivalent when there is no spillover effect of advertising activities. We also show that the comparison of the open‐loop solution and the memoryless closed‐loop solution depends on whether the firms' outputs are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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