Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological.
Classic inductive skepticism–the epistemological claim that we have no good reason to believe that the unobserved resembles the observed–is plausibly everyone's lot, whether or not they embrace Hume's metaphysical claim that distinct existents are "entirely loose and separate". But contemporary advo...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 905 - 926 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Classic inductive skepticism–the epistemological claim that we have no good reason to believe that the unobserved resembles the observed–is plausibly everyone's lot, whether or not they embrace Hume's metaphysical claim that distinct existents are "entirely loose and separate". But contemporary advocates of a Humean metaphysic accept a metaphysical claim stronger than Hume's own. I argue that their view plausibly gives rise to a radical inductive skepticism–according to which we are downright irrational in believing as we do about the unobserved–that we don't otherwise have reason to accept. The Metaphysical Neo-Humean is in an epistemological quagmire all her own. |
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