Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological.
Classic inductive skepticism–the epistemological claim that we have no good reason to believe that the unobserved resembles the observed–is plausibly everyone's lot, whether or not they embrace Hume's metaphysical claim that distinct existents are "entirely loose and separate". But contemporary advo...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 905 - 926 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153650812&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153650812 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153650812 10.1007/s11229-020-02741-w ppf: 905 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 357KB tig: atl: Humeanisms: metaphysical and epistemological. aug: au: Segal, Aaron affil: Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 5503 Humanities Building, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel su: Metaphysics sug: subj: Metaphysics keyword: Denial of necessary connections Epistemological humeanism Metaphysical humeanism Problem of induction ab: Classic inductive skepticism–the epistemological claim that we have no good reason to believe that the unobserved resembles the observed–is plausibly everyone's lot, whether or not they embrace Hume's metaphysical claim that distinct existents are "entirely loose and separate". But contemporary advocates of a Humean metaphysic accept a metaphysical claim stronger than Hume's own. I argue that their view plausibly gives rise to a radical inductive skepticism–according to which we are downright irrational in believing as we do about the unobserved–that we don't otherwise have reason to accept. The Metaphysical Neo-Humean is in an epistemological quagmire all her own. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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