Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.
Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show ho...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 128 - 152 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without assuming additivity. |
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