Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.
Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show ho...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 128 - 152 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2022
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without assuming additivity. |
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