Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.
Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show ho...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 128 - 152 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159632388&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159632388 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2022 vid: 89 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 159632388 10.1017/psa.2021.17 ppf: 128 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 241KB tig: atl: Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity. aug: au: Pettigrew, Richard affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK su: Theory of knowledge Argument Continuity sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Argument Continuity ab: Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without assuming additivity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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