The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how.
Much of our know‐how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 105; no. 3; pp. 619 - 638 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=161605673&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 161605673 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2022 vid: 105 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 161605673 10.1111/phpr.12832 ppf: 619 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 420KB tig: atl: The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how. aug: au: Piñeros Glasscock, Juan S. affil: Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University su: Evans, Gareth Cooking Dance Creative ability Learning ability sug: subj: Evans, Gareth Cooking Dance Creative ability Learning ability ab: Much of our know‐how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge‐how comes in degrees, and through practice a person gradually learns how to do something. However, the two standard accounts of know‐how in the literature, intellectualism and anti‐intellectualism, cannot properly account for the distinctive way in which know‐how is gradually acquired by practice, a process in which conceptual representations and practical abilities are intimately interwoven. Drawing on Gareth Evans's work, I outline an account that may do so, and use this account to distinguish between two forms of learning to explain why skill generally cannot be learnt through testimony, and requires practice. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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