The "curse of knowledge" when predicting others' knowledge.
To succeed in a social world, we must be able to accurately estimate what others know. For example, teachers must anticipate student knowledge to plan lessons and communicate effectively. Yet one's own knowledge consistently contaminates estimates about others' knowledge. We examine how one's knowle...
| Publicado en: | Memory & Cognition Vol. 51; no. 5; pp. 1214 - 1235 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jul2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=164432694&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 164432694 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0090502X MEG jtl: Memory & Cognition issn: 0090502X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2023 vid: 51 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 164432694 10.3758/s13421-022-01382-3 ppf: 1214 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.7MB tig: atl: The "curse of knowledge" when predicting others' knowledge. aug: au: Tullis, Jonathan G. Feder, Brennen affil: Department of Educational Psychology, University of Arizona, 1430 E. Second St., 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA su: Ego (Psychology) Judgment (Psychology) Social perception Self-perception Task performance Cognition Learning Intellect Experimental design Thought & thinking Prompts (Psychology) sug: subj: Ego (Psychology) Judgment (Psychology) Social perception Self-perception Task performance Cognition Learning Intellect Experimental design Thought & thinking Prompts (Psychology) keyword: Curse of knowledge Egocentrism Expertise bias Metacognition Perspective-taking Curse of knowledge Egocentrism Expertise bias Metacognition Perspective-taking ab: To succeed in a social world, we must be able to accurately estimate what others know. For example, teachers must anticipate student knowledge to plan lessons and communicate effectively. Yet one's own knowledge consistently contaminates estimates about others' knowledge. We examine how one's knowledge influences the calibration and resolution of participants' estimates of novices' knowledge. Across four experiments, participants studied trivia questions and estimated the percentage of novice participants who would know the answer across multiple study/estimation rounds. When participants were required to answer the question before estimating what novices would know, studying the facts impaired both the calibration and resolution of the estimates. Studying the facts reduced the validity of one's experiences for predicting novices' knowledge, and estimators utilized their own experiences less when predicting novices' knowledge as they studied. Experimentally reducing reliance on one's own knowledge did not improve the accuracy of estimates. The results suggest that learning impairs the accuracy of judgments of others' knowledge, not because estimators rely too heavily on their own experiences, but because estimators lack diagnostic cues about others' knowledge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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