On excessive entry in Bayes‐Cournot oligopoly.

In a Cournot industry where firms are privately informed about their marginal costs, raising entry barriers (i.e., imposing strictly positive, but not too large, entry costs) increases expected output, entrants' profits, total welfare, and might benefit consumers. Under Bayes‐Cournot competition, fi...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 719 - 749
Autores principales:	Bisceglia, Michele, Padilla, Jorge, Perkins, Joe, Piccolo, Salvatore
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Dec2024
Materias:	Consumers Oligopolies Cost Business enterprises Direct costing
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost