On excessive entry in Bayes‐Cournot oligopoly.
In a Cournot industry where firms are privately informed about their marginal costs, raising entry barriers (i.e., imposing strictly positive, but not too large, entry costs) increases expected output, entrants' profits, total welfare, and might benefit consumers. Under Bayes‐Cournot competition, fi...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 719 - 749 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=181730983&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 181730983 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 55 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 181730983 10.1111/1756-2171.12479 ppf: 719 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 759KB tig: atl: On excessive entry in Bayes‐Cournot oligopoly. aug: au: Bisceglia, Michele Padilla, Jorge Perkins, Joe Piccolo, Salvatore affil: Toulouse School of Economics, University of Bergamo Compass Lexecon University of Bergamo, Compass Lexecon and CSEF su: Consumers Oligopolies Cost Business enterprises Direct costing sug: subj: Consumers Oligopolies Cost Business enterprises Direct costing keyword: Bayes‐Cournot game entry welfare Bayes‐Cournot game entry welfare ab: In a Cournot industry where firms are privately informed about their marginal costs, raising entry barriers (i.e., imposing strictly positive, but not too large, entry costs) increases expected output, entrants' profits, total welfare, and might benefit consumers. Under Bayes‐Cournot competition, firms react to the expectation (conditional on entry) of rivals' costs rather than to their actual costs. This creates scope for entry by relatively inefficient types. Entry costs that prevent these high‐cost types from entering increase inframarginal (lower‐cost) types' and rivals' expected output. As a result, they increase profits and, unless they reduce output variability too much, also consumer surplus. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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