On excessive entry in Bayes‐Cournot oligopoly.

In a Cournot industry where firms are privately informed about their marginal costs, raising entry barriers (i.e., imposing strictly positive, but not too large, entry costs) increases expected output, entrants' profits, total welfare, and might benefit consumers. Under Bayes‐Cournot competition, fi...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 719 - 749
Main Authors:	Bisceglia, Michele, Padilla, Jorge, Perkins, Joe, Piccolo, Salvatore
Format:	Article
Published:	Wiley-Blackwell Dec2024
Subjects:	Consumers Oligopolies Cost Business enterprises Direct costing
Online Access:	View this record in EBSCOhost