The Buyer Power Effect of Retail Mergers: An Empirical Model of Bargaining with Equilibrium of Fear.
We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer‐retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an "equilibrium of...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 194 - 216 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Summer2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |