The Buyer Power Effect of Retail Mergers: An Empirical Model of Bargaining with Equilibrium of Fear.
We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer‐retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an "equilibrium of...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 194 - 216 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Summer2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=185068909&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 185068909 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Summer2025 vid: 56 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 185068909 10.1111/1756-2171.12498 ppf: 194 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 523KB tig: atl: The Buyer Power Effect of Retail Mergers: An Empirical Model of Bargaining with Equilibrium of Fear. aug: au: Bonnet, Céline Bouamra‐Mechemache, Zohra Molina, Hugo affil: Toulouse School of Economics, INRAE, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France Paris‐Saclay Applied Economics, Université Paris‐Saclay, INRAE, AgroParisTech, Palaiseau, France su: Retail industry Negotiation Soft drink industry Bargaining power Mergers & acquisitions sug: subj: Retail industry Negotiation All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores) All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores) All other miscellaneous general merchandise stores All Other Specialty Food Stores Non-alcoholic beverage merchant wholesalers Soft drink and ice manufacturing Soft Drink Manufacturing Soft drink industry Bargaining power Mergers & acquisitions keyword: bargaining bilateral oligopoly retail mergers soft drink industry bargaining bilateral oligopoly retail mergers soft drink industry ab: We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer‐retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an "equilibrium of fear". We estimate our framework in the French soft drink industry and find that retailers have greater bargaining power than manufacturers. Using counterfactual simulations, we highlight that retail mergers increase retailers' fear of disagreement relative to that of manufacturers, which weakens their buyer power and leads to higher wholesale and retail prices. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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