The Buyer Power Effect of Retail Mergers: An Empirical Model of Bargaining with Equilibrium of Fear.

We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer‐retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an "equilibrium of...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 194 - 216
Main Authors:	Bonnet, Céline, Bouamra‐Mechemache, Zohra, Molina, Hugo
Format:	Article
Published:	Wiley-Blackwell Summer2025
Subjects:	Retail industry Negotiation Soft drink industry Bargaining power Mergers & acquisitions
Online Access:	View this record in EBSCOhost