Gender Norms and Network Structure: A Model of the Intrahousehold Division of Labor.

This study presents a bargaining model with endogenous gender norms. Agents are heterogeneous in their wage rates and preferences but seek to conform to the behavior of their social reference group. In contrast to the previous literature, which assumes a homogeneous social norm, agents are connected...

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Publicado en:Feminist Economics Vol. 31; no. 3; pp. 237 - 275
Autores principales: Hager, Theresa, Mellacher, Patrick, Rath, Magdalena
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Jul2025
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Gender Norms and Network Structure: A Model of the Intrahousehold Division of Labor.
      aug:
        au:
          Hager, Theresa
          Mellacher, Patrick
          Rath, Magdalena
        affil:
          Johannes Kepler Universität Linz - Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy (ICAE), Linz, Austria
          University of Graz - Graz Schumpeter Centre, Graz, Austria
          University of Graz - Graz Schumpeter Centre, Universitätsstraße, Graz, Austria
      su:
        Division of labor
        Social networks
        Equality
        Negotiation
        Gender inequality
        Social influence
        Social norms
        Social structure
      sug:
        subj:
          Division of labor
          Social networks
          Equality
          Negotiation
          Gender inequality
          Social influence
          Social norms
          Social structure
      keyword:
        agent-based model
        Intrahousehold bargaining
        social network
        social norms
      ab: This study presents a bargaining model with endogenous gender norms. Agents are heterogeneous in their wage rates and preferences but seek to conform to the behavior of their social reference group. In contrast to the previous literature, which assumes a homogeneous social norm, agents are connected through explicitly modeled social networks and thus face heterogeneous gender norms. In this model, social pressure to conform to gender norms exacerbates gender inequalities in the distribution of paid and unpaid labor resulting from a gender pay gap or gender-specific preferences. However, a heterogeneous norm causes agents to act significantly different from – and, on average, more egalitarian than – a homogenous norm. The differences are particularly strong if agents are more likely connected with others who have similar preferences. The findings suggest that technological revolutions such as social media could impact the intrahousehold division of labor by changing the social reference group of individuals. HIGHLIGHTS The study introduces a theoretical model of the intrahousehold division of labor influenced by gender norms. People want to conform to the behavior of others (gender norms). People only observe the behavior of a subset of the population. Network-mediated norms produce more egalitarian outcomes than a global norm. Study emphasizes the importance of considering network structures in gender norm studies.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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      custom: Copyright of Feminist Economics is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
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