Consciousness, context, and know-how.
Abstract  In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394â409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53â61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 160; no. 1; pp. 123 - 154 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=28044173&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 28044173 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2008 vid: 160 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 28044173 10.1007/s11229-006-9103-3 ppf: 123 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 494KB tig: atl: Consciousness, context, and know-how. aug: au: Charles Wallis affil: California State University, Long Beach Department of Philosophy 1250 Bellflower Boulevard, McIntosh Humanities, Building (MHB) 917 Long Beach CA 90840-2408 USA su: Consciousness Cognitive science Carr, David, 1940- Mind & body sug: subj: Consciousness Cognitive science Carr, David, 1940- Mind & body ab: Abstract  In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394â409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53â61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(1), 87â96] and Stanley & Williamson [2001, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411â444]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight in to the use of know-how in contemporary cognitive science. Specifically, I claim that Carrâs necessary conditions for know-how fail to capture the distinction he himself draws between ability and knowing-how. Moreover, Carr ties knowing-how to conscious intent, and to an explicit knowledge of procedural rules. I argue that both moves are mistakes, which together render Carrâs theory an inadequate account both of common ascriptions of knowledge-how and of widely accepted ascriptions of knowledge-how within explanations in cognitive science. Finally, I note that Carrâs conditions fail to capture intuitions (heshares) regarding the ascription of know-how to persons lacking ability. I then consider the position advocated by Stanley & Williamson (2001), which seems avoid Carrâs commitments to conscious intent and explicit knowledge while still maintaining that âknowledge-how is simply a species of knowledge-that" (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 411). I argue that Stanley and Williamsonâs attempt to frame a reductionist view that avoids consciously occurrent beliefs during exercises of knowledge-how and explicit knowledge of procedural rules is both empirically implausible and explanatorily vacuous. In criticizing these theories I challenge the presuppositions of the most pervasive response to Ryle in the philosophic literature, what might be described as âthe received view." I also establish several facts about knowing-how. First, neither conscious intent nor explicit representation (much less conscious representation) of procedural rules are necessary for knowing-how given the theory of cognition current in cognitive science. I argue that the discussed analyses fail to capture the necessary conditions for knowledge-how because know-how requires the instantiation of an ability and of the capacities necessary for exploiting an abilityânot conscious awareness of purpose or explicit knowledge of rules. Second, one must understand knowledge-how as task-specific, i.e., as presupposing certain underlying conditions. Conceiving of know-how as task-specific allows one to understand ascriptions of know-how in the absence of ability as counterfactual ascriptions based upon underlying competence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2008. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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