Exactness, inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability.
Abstract  I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents âinexactlyâ, and that this results in violations of the...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 164; no. 2; pp. 289 - 313 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Sep2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Abstract  I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents âinexactlyâ, and that this results in violations of the transitivity of colour indiscriminability. I show that Hellieâs argument remains inconclusive, since he does not demonstrate conclusively that colour perception really does represent inexactly. My own argument for the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability uses inexactness instead as one horn of a dilemma: the key idea is that there is a class of perceptual experiences which might plausibly be supposed either to represent inexactly or to represent exactlyâbut which demonstrate the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability either way. |
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