Exactness, inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability.
Abstract  I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents âinexactlyâ, and that this results in violations of the...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 164; no. 2; pp. 289 - 313 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2008
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=33328117&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 33328117 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2008 vid: 164 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 33328117 10.1007/s11229-007-9227-0 ppf: 289 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 208KB tig: atl: Exactness, inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. aug: au: Charles Pelling affil: University of Reading Department of Philosophy Reading RG6 6AA UK su: Exact (Philosophy) Perception (Philosophy) Color (Philosophy) Color vision Dilemma sug: subj: Exact (Philosophy) Perception (Philosophy) Color (Philosophy) Color vision Dilemma ab: Abstract  I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents âinexactlyâ, and that this results in violations of the transitivity of colour indiscriminability. I show that Hellieâs argument remains inconclusive, since he does not demonstrate conclusively that colour perception really does represent inexactly. My own argument for the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability uses inexactness instead as one horn of a dilemma: the key idea is that there is a class of perceptual experiences which might plausibly be supposed either to represent inexactly or to represent exactlyâbut which demonstrate the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability either way. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2008. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2008 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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