Exactness, inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability.

Abstract  I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents ‘inexactly’, and that this results in violations of the...

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Publicado en:	Synthese Vol. 164; no. 2; pp. 289 - 313
Autor principal:	Charles Pelling
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Springer Nature Sep2008
Materias:	Exact (Philosophy) Perception (Philosophy) Color (Philosophy) Color vision Dilemma
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost