Why do employers only reward extreme performance? Examining the relationships among performance, pay, and turnover.
This study develops an efficiency explanation for commonly observed performance-based compensation contracts that aggressively reward extreme performance while largely disregarding performance distinctions for moderate performance levels. In response to this reward-the-extremes contract, the paper...
| Published in: | Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 37; pp. 198 - 220 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Administrative Science Quarterly
June 1992
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=508427930&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 508427930 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00018392 ASQ jtl: Administrative Science Quarterly issn: 00018392 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: June 1992 vid: 37 pid: 224 pub: Administrative Science Quarterly artinfo: ui: 508427930 10.2307/2393221 ppf: 198 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Why do employers only reward extreme performance? Examining the relationships among performance, pay, and turnover. aug: au: Zenger, Todd R. su: Pay for performance Labor turnover Labor supply Management Engineers Employment sug: subj: Pay for performance Labor turnover Labor supply Management Engineers Employment ab: This study develops an efficiency explanation for commonly observed performance-based compensation contracts that aggressively reward extreme performance while largely disregarding performance distinctions for moderate performance levels. In response to this reward-the-extremes contract, the paper predicts a relationship between performance and turnover that fluctuates by performance level. Evidence of the hypothesized contract and the resulting pattern of turnover are provided empirically with data collected from 984 engineering employees of two large high-technology companies in the San Francisco Bay Area. The data confirm that extremely high and moderately low performers are likely to remain in firms offering these contracts while moderately high and extremely low performers are likely to depart. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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