Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets.

The writers discuss the A. Mas-Colell and L. Zhou bargaining sets and demonstrate that they need not converge in replica sequences of economies. They reveal that the measure of the set of individually rational Pareto optimal equal-treatment (IRPOET) allocations that are not in the Mas-Colell and Zh...

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Publicado en:Econometrica Vol. 65; no. 05; pp. 1227 - 1240
Autores principales: Anderson, Robert M., Trockel, Walter, Zhou, Lin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell September 1997
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets.
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        au:
          Anderson, Robert M.
          Trockel, Walter
          Zhou, Lin
      su:
        Economics
        Game theory
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Negotiation
        Mathematical models
      sug:
        subj:
          Economics
          Game theory
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Negotiation
          Mathematical models
      ab: The writers discuss the A. Mas-Colell and L. Zhou bargaining sets and demonstrate that they need not converge in replica sequences of economies. They reveal that the measure of the set of individually rational Pareto optimal equal-treatment (IRPOET) allocations that are not in the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets tends to zero as the economy is replicated and that the set of IRPOET bargaining set allocations converges in the Hausdorff distance to the set of all IRPOET allocations.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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