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Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets.

The writers discuss the A. Mas-Colell and L. Zhou bargaining sets and demonstrate that they need not converge in replica sequences of economies. They reveal that the measure of the set of individually rational Pareto optimal equal-treatment (IRPOET) allocations that are not in the Mas-Colell and Zh...

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Published in:Econometrica Vol. 65; no. 05; pp. 1227 - 1240
Main Authors: Anderson, Robert M., Trockel, Walter, Zhou, Lin
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell September 1997
Subjects:
Economics
Game theory
Resource allocation > Mathematical models
Negotiation
Mathematical models
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost

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