Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou bargaining sets.

The writers discuss the A. Mas-Colell and L. Zhou bargaining sets and demonstrate that they need not converge in replica sequences of economies. They reveal that the measure of the set of individually rational Pareto optimal equal-treatment (IRPOET) allocations that are not in the Mas-Colell and Zh...

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Publicado en:	Econometrica Vol. 65; no. 05; pp. 1227 - 1240
Autores principales:	Anderson, Robert M., Trockel, Walter, Zhou, Lin
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell September 1997
Materias:	Economics Game theory Resource allocation > Mathematical models Negotiation Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost