The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency.
Bureaucracies tend to be used when consumers cannot be trusted to choose outcomes efficiently. But a primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. But this can give bureaucrats an incentive to inefficiently accede to consumer demands to avoid a complaint. I show that when this ince...
| Published in: | Journal of Political Economy Vol. 111; no. 5; pp. 929 - 959 |
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| Format: | Article |
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University of Chicago Press
October 2003
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513150373&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513150373 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223808 JPE jtl: Journal of Political Economy issn: 00223808 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2003 vid: 111 iid: 5 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 513150373 10.1086/376956 ppf: 929 ppct: 30 formats: tig: atl: The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency. aug: au: Prendergast, Canice su: Bureaucracy Legislative oversight Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Bureaucracy Legislative oversight Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: Bureaucracies tend to be used when consumers cannot be trusted to choose outcomes efficiently. But a primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. But this can give bureaucrats an incentive to inefficiently accede to consumer demands to avoid a complaint. I show that when this incentive is important, bureaucracies (efficiently) respond by (i) ignoring legitimate consumer complaints, (ii) monitoring more in situations in which it is not needed, (iii) delaying decision making “too long,” and (iv) biasing oversight against consumers. I also show that bureaucracies are used only when consumers cannot be trusted. As a result, observed bureaucracies are always inefficient. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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