The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.
We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuroscience explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phenomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 78; no. 4; pp. 601 - 628 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Oct2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuroscience explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phenomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive ?fields are explored. |
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