The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.
We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuroscience explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phenomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 78; no. 4; pp. 601 - 628 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=66164281&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 66164281 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2011 vid: 78 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 66164281 10.1086/661755 ppf: 601 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 175KB tig: atl: The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective. aug: au: Kaplan, David Michael Craver, Carl F. affil: Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University School of Medicine, Box 8108, 660 South Euclid Avenue, Saint Louis, MO 63110 Department of Philosophy, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University, St. Louis, 1 Brookings Drive, Wilson Hall, Saint Louis, MO 63130 su: Mathematical models Neurosciences Gaussian processes Paradigm (Theory of knowledge) Cognitive science sug: subj: Mathematical models Neurosciences Gaussian processes Paradigm (Theory of knowledge) Cognitive science ab: We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuroscience explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phenomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive ?fields are explored. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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