The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.

We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuroscience explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phenomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Philosophy of Science Vol. 78; no. 4; pp. 601 - 628
Autores principales:	Kaplan, David Michael, Craver, Carl F.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Cambridge University Press Oct2011
Materias:	Mathematical models Neurosciences Gaussian processes Paradigm (Theory of knowledge) Cognitive science
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost