Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist

Abstract: Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distr...

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Publicado en:	Journal of Environmental Economics & Management Vol. 64; no. 3; pp. 410 - 427
Autores principales:	Prieger, James E., Sanders, Nicholas J.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Academic Press Inc. Nov2012
Materias:	Monopolistic competition Economic activity Externalities Economic demand Bayesian analysis Knowledge management Approximation theory
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost