Cover Image
QR Code

Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist

Abstract: Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distr...

Full description

Published in:Journal of Environmental Economics & Management Vol. 64; no. 3; pp. 410 - 427
Main Authors: Prieger, James E., Sanders, Nicholas J.
Format: Article
Published: Academic Press Inc. Nov2012
Subjects:
Monopolistic competition
Economic activity
Externalities
Economic demand
Bayesian analysis
Knowledge management
Approximation theory
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost

Internet

View this record in EBSCOhost