Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist
Abstract: Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distr...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Environmental Economics & Management Vol. 64; no. 3; pp. 410 - 427 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
Nov2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=83576908&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 83576908 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00950696 EEM jtl: Journal of Environmental Economics & Management issn: 00950696 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2012 vid: 64 iid: 3 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 83576908 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.05.006 ppf: 410 ppct: 17 formats: tig: atl: Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist aug: au: Prieger, James E. Sanders, Nicholas J. affil: School of Public Policy, Pepperdine University, 24255 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, CA 90263, United States Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, Morton Hall, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, United States su: Monopolistic competition Economic activity Externalities Economic demand Bayesian analysis Knowledge management Approximation theory sug: subj: Monopolistic competition Economic activity Externalities Economic demand Bayesian analysis Knowledge management Approximation theory keyword: Polluting monopolist Surplus subsidy schemes Verifiable regulatory mechanisms Polluting monopolist Surplus subsidy schemes Verifiable regulatory mechanisms ab: Abstract: Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution. We introduce mechanisms adapted to use less information. Our Price-based Subsidy (PS) mechanisms give the firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period. The regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand, cost, or damage functions of the firm. All of the mechanisms induce the firm to price at marginal social cost, either immediately or asymptotically. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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