PAY SECRECY AND EFFORT PROVISION.
Pay secrecy is often justified on the ground of concerns about the detrimental consequences of intra-firm pay comparisons for work morale and performance. Surprisingly, however, there is only limited empirical evidence that the availability of pay comparison information is detrimental for effort pro...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 51; no. 3; pp. 1779 - 1795 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2013
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=87447406&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 87447406 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2013 vid: 51 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 87447406 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00484.x ppf: 1779 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 775KB tig: atl: PAY SECRECY AND EFFORT PROVISION. aug: au: NOSENZO, DANIELE affil: NosENzo: School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. Phone +44(0)115 84 67492, Fax +44(0)115 95 14159, Email su: Wages Secrecy Pay equity Wage differentials Comparison (Psychology) Compensation management sug: subj: Wages Secrecy Pay equity Wage differentials Human Resources Consulting Services Comparison (Psychology) Compensation management ab: Pay secrecy is often justified on the ground of concerns about the detrimental consequences of intra-firm pay comparisons for work morale and performance. Surprisingly, however, there is only limited empirical evidence that the availability of pay comparison information is detrimental for effort provision. In this paper, I study pay comparison effects in a gift-exchange game laboratory experiment where an employer is matched with two symmetric employees. I compare effort choices made by employees in a 'pay secrecy' treatment and in two 'public wages' treatments where employees are informed of the wage paid to the co-worker. In one 'public wages' treatment the employer can choose both wages she pays to the employees, while in the other treatment the wage paid to one employee is regulated exogenously. I show that pay disclosure can be detrimental for effort provision if employees are treated unequally. ( JEL A13, C92, J31) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|