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Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms.

Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid th...

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Published in:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 44; no. 3; pp. 438 - 462
Main Authors: Fukuda, Emiko, Kamijo, Yoshio, Takeuchi, Ai, Masui, Michiharu, Funaki, Yukihiko
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Autumn2013
Subjects:
Economic equilibrium
Auctions
Financial performance
Comparative studies
Revenue bonds
Strategic planning
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost