Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms.

Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid th...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 44; no. 3; pp. 438 - 462
Autores principales:	Fukuda, Emiko, Kamijo, Yoshio, Takeuchi, Ai, Masui, Michiharu, Funaki, Yukihiko
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Autumn2013
Materias:	Economic equilibrium Auctions Financial performance Comparative studies Revenue bonds Strategic planning
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost