Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms.
Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid th...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 44; no. 3; pp. 438 - 462 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Autumn2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=92775569&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 92775569 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Autumn2013 vid: 44 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 92775569 10.1111/1756-2171.12026 ppf: 438 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 536KB tig: atl: Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms. aug: au: Fukuda, Emiko Kamijo, Yoshio Takeuchi, Ai Masui, Michiharu Funaki, Yukihiko affil: National Defense Academy of Japan Kochi University of Technology Ritsumeikan University Ishinomaki Senshu University Waseda University su: Economic equilibrium Auctions Financial performance Comparative studies Revenue bonds Strategic planning sug: subj: Economic equilibrium Auctions Financial performance Comparative studies Revenue bonds Strategic planning ab: Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the 'locally envy-free Nash equilibrium' to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the auctioneer's revenue coincide in the two mechanisms. A laboratory experiment, in which the revenues and efficiencies were similar in both mechanisms, supported this result. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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