Top-Level Design and Fragmented Decision-Making: A Case Study of an SOE Merger in China’s High-Speed Rail Industry.
State-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms have typically been considered the result of bargaining under China’s fragmented bureaucratic structure. This study uses the case of the CNR–CSR merger to investigate the latent changes that have recently occurred in the policy-making structure of SOE reforms. Th...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 27; no. 109; pp. 151 - 165 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jan2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=127211305&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 127211305 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10670564 LCC jtl: Journal of Contemporary China issn: 10670564 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2018 vid: 27 iid: 109 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 127211305 10.1080/10670564.2017.1363027 ppf: 151 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 127211305 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 127211305 tig: atl: Top-Level Design and Fragmented Decision-Making: A Case Study of an SOE Merger in China’s High-Speed Rail Industry. aug: au: Huang, Dongya affil: Sun Yat-sen University, China su: China Government business enterprises Policy sciences Authoritarianism Decision making Law reform Railroad mergers sug: subj: Government business enterprises Policy sciences Authoritarianism Decision making Law reform China Passenger rail transportation Short Line Railroads Line-Haul Railroads Railroad mergers ab: State-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms have typically been considered the result of bargaining under China’s fragmented bureaucratic structure. This study uses the case of the CNR–CSR merger to investigate the latent changes that have recently occurred in the policy-making structure of SOE reforms. This study will demonstrate that ‘top-level design’—in the context of a strengthened political authority and centralised political power—dominates SOE reforms and changes the pattern of fragmented interest bargaining among government departments and SOEs. In this context, the national strategy can be implemented with little resistance, contradicting scholarly predictions of fragmented authoritarianism. However, the top-level design does not appear to be based on a rational decision-making process; rather, its goals are vague, and the methods for achieving them have not been debated rationally. The policy-making process in this case study involved figuring out the top-level leaders’ intentions and rationalising the decisions afterwards. A top-level design with weak rationality may have risky consequences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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