Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise po...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 97; no. 1; pp. 86 - 105 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. |
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