Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise po...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 97; no. 1; pp. 86 - 105 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=135800831&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 135800831 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2019 vid: 97 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 135800831 10.1080/00048402.2018.1434550 ppf: 86 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 571KB tig: atl: Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions. aug: au: Habgood-Coote, Joshua affil: University of Bristol su: Anti-intellectualism Debate Theory of knowledge Semantics Speech act theory (Communication) sug: subj: Anti-intellectualism Debate Theory of knowledge Semantics Speech act theory (Communication) keyword: anti-intellectualism intellectualism know-how knowledge-how knowledge-wh practical knowledge ab: The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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