IMMATERIAL REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN A VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION EXPERIMENT.
In this article, we compare the causes and effects of immaterial rewards and sanctions on cooperation in a voluntary contribution experiment. It appears that both rewards and sanctions increase contributions (and that rewards are more effective than sanctions) only when subjects interact repeatedly...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 51; no. 2; p. 1442 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=85761134&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 85761134 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2013 vid: 51 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 85761134 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00433.x ppf: 1442 ppct: 0 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 680KB tig: atl: IMMATERIAL REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN A VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION EXPERIMENT. aug: au: PEETERS, RONALD VORSATZ, MARC affil: Peeters: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands. Phone +31‐43‐3883730, Fax +31‐43‐3884878, E‐mail Vorsatz: Ramón y Cajal Researcher, Fundación de Estudios de Economía Applicada (FEDEA), Madrid, Spain. Phone +34‐914‐359‐209, Fax +34‐915‐779‐575, E‐mail. su: Psychological feedback Punishment (Psychology) Human behavior Psychology Emoticons & emojis Awards Statistical matching sug: subj: Psychological feedback Punishment (Psychology) Human behavior Psychology Emoticons & emojis Awards Statistical matching ab: In this article, we compare the causes and effects of immaterial rewards and sanctions on cooperation in a voluntary contribution experiment. It appears that both rewards and sanctions increase contributions (and that rewards are more effective than sanctions) only when subjects interact repeatedly within the same group. The effect is, however, insignificant, which could be due to the higher variance in presence of rewards and sanctions. Furthermore, it is evidenced that rewards have some negative effect on the future contribution for both the imposer and the imposed when the partner matching is applied, but both rewards and sanctions have mainly positive effects under the stranger matching. Thus it seems that the recipient of the feedback takes the message as a reliable external evaluation of her contribution only under the stranger matching protocol when the strategic use of feedback can largely be excluded. ( JEL C92, H41) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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